We study a sequential Tullock contest with two stages and two identical prizes. The players compete for one prize in each stage and each player may win either one or two prizes. The players have either decreasing or increasing marginal values for the prizes, which are commonly known, and there is a constraint on the total e¤ort that each player can exert in both stages. We analyze the players'allocations of e¤orts along both stages when the budget constraints (e¤ort constraints) are either restrictive, nonrestrictive or partially restrictive. In particular, we show that when the players are either symmetric or asymmetric and the budget constraints are restrictive, independent of the players'values for the prizes, each player allocates his e¤ort equally along both stages of the contest.
Introduction
In real life contests contestants usually face budget constraints, which implies that there will be constraints on the total e¤ort that the contestants are able to exert. A budget constraint completely changes the contestants' equilibrium behavior compared to the same contests without budget constraints. This was shown, among others, by Gale (1997, 1998) and Gavious, Moldovanu and Sela (2003) in a single-stage contest. 1 In sequential multi-stage contests, however, the e¤ect of the budget constraints on the players'strategies is even more complex than in single-stage contests since the choice of e¤orts in the early stages of the contest in ‡uences the choice of e¤orts in the later stages. 2 In this regard, Amegashie, Cadsby and Song (2007) as well as Matros (2006) showed that if players have budget constraints they exert more e¤ort in the initial rounds than in the following ones, and Harbaugh and Klumpp (2005) showed in a two-stage contest that weak players exert more e¤ort in the …rst stage whereas strong players save more e¤ort for the second stage.
In this paper we analyze the model of a two-stage Tullock contest which is similar to the two-stage all-pay auction model studied by Sela (2009) . In contrast to that paper, we consider a multi-stage contest with budget-constrained players and, furthermore, unlike most of the literature on multi-stage contests with budget-constrained players, we assume that a synergy exists between the players'values for the prizes in both stages of the contest. These two factors combined makes the analysis of our sequential contest complicated but also more interesting and realistic. In fact even without any budget constraints more complex strategies are involved since each player may win more than one prize and therefore players may face many options that depend on the identity of the winner in each stage, and each of these options may have a di¤erent e¤ect on the chance of each player to win the other prizes in the later stages. In particular, in sequential multi-prize contests, each player has to decide in which stages he will compete to win and in which stages he will quit and reserve his e¤ort for the other rounds. Moreover, the players'decisions become more complicated when we add a constraint on the total e¤ort that each player can exert in both stages.
Formally, our model considers a sequential Tullock contest with two stages and two identical prizes. The players compete for one prize in each stage and each player may win either one or two prizes. We …rst assume that the players are symmetric and have the same marginal values (decreasing or increasing) for the prizes, which are commonly known, and we also assume that there is a constraint on the total e¤ort that each player can exert in both stages. We show that when the budget constraint is nonrestrictive and the players' marginal values for the prizes are decreasing the total e¤ort in the …rst stage of the contest is always lower than the total e¤ort in the second stage. On the other hand, when the players'marginal values for the prizes are increasing and the budget constraint is nonrestrictive the total e¤ort in the …rst stage of the contest is always higher than the total e¤ort in the second stage. Then, we let the players be either symmetric or asymmetric and we show the main result of this paper, namely, if the budget constraint is restrictive, each player allocates his budget constraint equally along the contest's stages independent of the players'values for both the prizes and the budget constraints. In particular, the players' total e¤ort in the …rst stage of the contest is always equal to the total e¤ort in the second stage. We conclude that in sequential Tullock contests with synergy if the players have su¢ ciently low budget constraints, the players'values for the prizes in both stages do not have any e¤ect on their allocation of e¤orts.
The paper most related to our work is that of Benoit and Krishna (2001) who analyzed sequential …rst and second price auctions with synergy between the stages and a budget constraint. 3 They found that in a sequential auction with a budget constraint it is optimal to sell the more valuable object …rst. They also showed that if the discrepancy in the values is large, the sequential auction yields more revenue than the simultaneous auction, but if it is small the simultaneous auction is superior. Furthermore, in Benoit and Krishna's model it might be advantageous for a bidder to bid aggressively for one object even when he does not plan to win since by increasing the price he depletes his opponent's budget such that the other objects may then be obtained at a lower price. In our sequential contest, the players incur costs as a result of their e¤orts in any case, and therefore a player does not have an incentive to increase his e¤ort in a stage at which he does not want to win since then he depletes his budget and his options in the following stages. Other papers that are related to our paper in which the focus is on the dependence between the e¤ort decisions along the di¤erent stages in the contest as a result of the budget constraint include Robson (2005) and Klumpp and Polborn (2006) . These authors consider the Colonel Blotto game, where in each battle…eld a Tullock contest takes place. In these models, the dependence between the stages is caused only by the budget constraint, while in our model the dependence is caused by the budget constraint and also by the synergy between the players'values for the prizes in each stage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our sequential two-stage Tullock contest with budget-constrained players. Section 3 analyzes this contest when the players are symmetric, and Section 4 presents several examples of the contest with di¤erent values of winning. Section 5 analyzes the contest with asymmetric players, Section 6 concludes.
The model
We consider a sequential Tullock contest with two symmetric players i; j 2 f1; 2g and two stages. In each of the stages a single (identical) prize is awarded. The values for the prizes are given by the vector 
and that they are common knowledge.
The players have a budget constraint denoted by w such that in both stages a player cannot exert a total e¤ort which is higher than w. We assume that a money unit is identical to an e¤ort unit. The players simultaneously exert e¤orts x i ; x j in the …rst stage, then the players'probabilities of winning are xi xi+xj and xj xi+xj respectively, and all the players bear the costs of their e¤orts. The players know the identity of the winner in the …rst stage before the beginning of the second stage, which means that the players'values in the second stage are common knowledge. Like in the …rst stage, the players simultaneously exert e¤orts with a budget constraint and with and without a synergy between the values of the prizes. e x i ; e x j , then the players'probabilities of winning are e xi e xi+e xj and e xj e xi+e xj respectively, and all the players bear the costs of their e¤orts.
Symmetric players
Consider a sequential Tullock contest with two symmetric players i; j 2 f1; 2g. We denote by x k i , k = a; b player i's e¤ort in the …rst stage of the contest in which he competes to win a prize that is equal to v k . We also denote by e x k i , k = a; b player i's e¤ort in the second stage of the contest when he competes to win a prize that is equal to v k . We consider below two di¤erent scenarios: the …rst is when players have decreasing marginal values and the second one is when the players have increasing marginal values. Given the players'strategies in the second stage, player i's maximization problem in the …rst stage is
s:t: 
Given the players'strategies in the second stage, player i's maximization problem in the …rst stage is:
s:t: . By our assumption of symmetry, player j's maximization problems are identical to those of player i.
For each scenario, either decreasing marginal values or increasing marginal values, we divide our analysis of the players'allocation of e¤ort along the contest's stages into three cases:
1.
Case A: the budget constraint is nonrestrictive (both of the restrictions in the above maximization problems ( (3) and (6)) are nonrestrictive).
2.
Case B: the budget constraint is restrictive (both of the restrictions in the above maximization problems ( (3) and (6)) are restrictive).
3.
Case C: the budget constraint is partially restrictive (only one of the restrictions in the above maximization problems ( (3) and (6)) is restrictive).
Case A: Nonrestrictive budget constraints
We assume …rst that the players have decreasing marginal
, and also that both of the restrictions in the maximization problem (3) are nonrestrictive. 4 Then, the following proposition de…nes the range of the budget constraint's values for which the budget constraint is nonrestrictive and characterizes the players'e¤ort allocation in both stages of the contest.
Proposition 1 In the sequential Tullock contest with symmetric players and decreasing marginal values
Then, the subgame perfect equilibrium is given by the following strategies:
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The equilibrium e¤ ort in the …rst stage is
The equilibrium e¤ orts in the second stage are
The above equilibrium strategies satisfy:
that is, if a player wins in the …rst stage his e¤ ort in that stage is always higher than his e¤ ort in the second stage.
2) x a < e x a ; that is, if a player loses in the …rst stage his e¤ ort in that stage is always lower than his e¤ ort in the second stage.
Proof. See Appendix.
In order to explain the players'e¤ort allocations over both stages of the contest we examine their 'real values'. In the …rst stage, a player's induced value ('real value') is the di¤erence between his expected payo¤ in the entire contest if he wins in the …rst stage and his expected payo¤ if he loses in the …rst stage. Thus, a player's induced value in the …rst stage is
2 is a player's expected payo¤ in the entire contest if he wins in the …rst stage, and
if he loses in the …rst stage.
The sum of the induced values in the …rst stage is Proof. See Appendix.
We assume now that players have increasing marginal
, and also that both of the restrictions in the maximization problem (6) are nonrestrictive. The following proposition de…nes the range of the budget constraint's values for which the budget constraint is nonrestrictive and characterizes the players'e¤ort allocation in both stages of the contest.
Proposition 3
In the sequential Tullock contest with symmetric players and increasing marginal values
The above equilibrium strategies satisfy: 6 The uniqueness of the subgame perfect equilibrium is obtained by the uniqueness of the equilibrium in the one-stage Tullock contest with two players.
; that is, the player's e¤ ort in the …rst stage is larger than his e¤ ort in the second stage given that he wins in the …rst stage. In addition, the e¤ ort in the second stage given that he wins in the …rst stage is larger than his e¤ ort in that stage given that he loses in the …rst one.
2) e x a x b > e x b if 0:5 v b < 1; that is, the player's e¤ ort in the …rst stage is smaller than his e¤ ort in the second stage given that he wins in the …rst stage, but it is larger than his e¤ ort in the second stage given that he loses in the …rst one.
In this scenario, the sum of the players'induced values in the …rst stage is
while the sum of the values in the second stage is Proof. See Appendix.
Case B: Restrictive budget constraints
We assume now that the players have either increasing or decreasing marginal values and that both of the restrictions in the maximization problems (3) and (6) in the subgame perfect equilibrium each player allocates his budget constraint equally along the contest's stages; that is,
In particular, the total e¤ ort in the …rst stage of the contest is always equal to the total e¤ ort in the second stage.
According to Proposition 5, independently of the players'values in both stages, they allocate their e¤ort equally along both of the stages. This essentially means that when the budget constraint is relatively low such that the players are restricted in both stages of the contest, the players'values do not a¤ect their e¤ort allocation along the contest. Later we will show that this result does not depend on the assumption of symmetry between the players.
Case C: Partially restrictive budget constraints
Here we assume that the players have decreasing marginal values and that only one of the restrictions in the maximization problem (3) w is restrictive as well. Therefore, we consider here the situation where only the second restriction in the maximization problem (3) is restrictive. The following proposition de…nes the range of the budget constraint's values for which the budget constraint is partially restrictive and presents the implicit equation that characterizes the players'allocation of e¤ort.
Proposition 6
In the sequential Tullock contest with symmetric players and decreasing marginal values
Then in the subgame perfect equilibrium each player's e¤ ort in the …rst stage (x a ) is determined by the following equation
= [
The e¤ orts in the second stage are given by
Next we assume that the players have increasing marginal values and that only one of the restrictions in the maximization problem (6) 
Then in the subgame perfect equilibrium each player's e¤ ort in the …rst stage (x b ) is determined by the following equation
Thus the e¤ orts in the second stage are given by
In the following section we present some examples which describe the players'allocations of e¤ort for all the ranges of the budget constraint.
Examples
In the following we consider two di¤erent situations:
We assume that the players are symmetric and have decreasing marginal values. Furthermore, the total e¤ort in the second stage of the contest, e x a + e x b is higher than or equal to the total e¤ort in its …rst stage, 2x a , namely, T E 1 T E 2 :
We assume that the players are symmetric and have increasing marginal values. (xj ) r (xi) r +(xj ) r respectively, where r is a constant that satis…es 0 < r < 2 (so far we assumed that r = 1). We focus here on the situation where both of the players have a restrictive budget constraint, which, it turns out, has somewhat unexpected results. 
If, on the other hand, player 2 wins in the …rst stage, the players'maximization problems are
and
Given the players'strategies in the second stage, player 1's maximization problem in the …rst stage is Since we assume that both players have a restrictive budget constraint we have
Thus, player 1's maximization problem in the …rst stage (equation (13)) is then
and player 2's maximization problem in the …rst stage (equation (14)) is then
The following theorem characterizes the players'allocation of e¤ort.
Theorem 1
In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential generalized Tullock contest with asymmetric players, independent of the players'values for the prizes in each stage, if the budget constraint is restrictive then each player allocates his budget constraint equally along both stages of the contest. In particular, the total e¤ ort in the …rst stage of the contest is always equal to the total e¤ ort in the second stage.
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. In the following we provide another mathematical explanation for the above result.
If the budget constraints are restrictive for both players, in both stages, then all of the four restrictions in the maximization problems (13) and (14) are restrictive such that
Thus we denote
Then the three …rst-order conditions of player 1's maximization problems ( (13), (9), (11)) are
where 1 and 2 are the Lagrangian multipliers. The …rst-order conditions (18) and (19) 
Note that both …rst-order conditions of player 1's maximization problem (17) and (20) are exactly the same if x = e x and y = e y: In other words, if player 2's allocation of e¤ort is symmetric, y = e y, then player 1's maximization problems in both stages are actually symmetric and therefore his allocation of e¤ort between both stages is the same, namely, x = e x. Similarly it can be shown that if player 1's allocation of e¤ort is symmetric x = e x; then player 2's maximization problems in both stages are symmetric, and therefore his allocation of e¤ort between both stages is the same, namely, y = e y: Thus, we obtain an equilibrium according to which x = e x and y = e y: The solution of the above two …rst-order conditions is:
The …rst-order condition of the maximization problem in the …rst stage (equation (3)) is
where e x a i ; e x a j ; e x b i ; e x b j are given by (21). Because of the symmetry we denote
Then the solution of the above …rst-order condition is
By normalizing ( v a = 1) we obtain
a is always positive.
Furthermore,
Now we examine the conditions under which the budget constraint is nonrestrictive. If the restrictions are nonrestrictive we have
Since x a + e x a > x a + e x b we obtain that the constraints are nonrestrictive i¤ w > x a + e x a : Thus, the condition that implies nonrestrictive budget constraints is
The Proof of Proposition 2
We proved in Proposition 1 that if v a is normalized to be 1, the budget constraint is nonrestrictive if
In this case the total e¤ort in the …rst stage of the contest is
and the total e¤ort in the second stage of the contest is
The di¤erence between the total e¤orts in both stages when the budget constraint is nonrestrictive is
Since v b < v a = 1 (decreasing marginal values) this di¤erence is negative and therefore T E 1 < T E 2 . Q:E:D:
The Proof of Proposition 3
If the budget constraint is nonrestrictive both of the restrictions in the maximization problem (6) are nonrestrictive such that
< w
< w
The …rst-order conditions of the maximization problems in the second stage (4) and (5) are
Because of the symmetry we denote The solution of the above two …rst-order conditions is
The …rst-order condition of the maximization problem in the …rst stage (equation (6)) is . Because of the symmetry we denote
By using the normalization ( v a = 1) we obtain
Since 0 < v b < 1, the di¤erence e x a e x b is always positive. Furthermore,
We also have
Since the expression 2(v b ) Now we examine the conditions under which the budget constraint is nonrestrictive. If the restrictions are nonrestrictive we have
we obtain that the constraints are nonrestrictive i¤ w > x b + e x a : Thus, the condition that implies nonrestrictive budget constraints is
Q:E:D:
The Proof of Proposition 4
We proved in Proposition 3 that if v a is normalized to be 1, the budget constraint is nonrestrictive if
The di¤erence between the total e¤orts in both stages when the budget constraint is nonrestrictive is Therefore the …rst-order condition is
Because of the symmetry we denote Then, the solution of the above …rst-order condition is:
and then by our assumption
In the second stage, player i's maximization problems are given by (1) and (2). The …rst-order conditions of these maximization problems are
In order that both constraints will be restrictive these …rst-order conditions of the maximization problems in the second stage should be positive. Thus, both constraints are restrictive i¤
In this case the total e¤ort in the …rst stage of the contest is T E 1 = 2x a = w and the total e¤ort in the second stage is
2) Assume now that the players have increasing marginal values. When the budget constraint is restrictive both of the restrictions in the maximization problem (6) are restrictive such that 
The …rst-order condition is
Because of the symmetry we denote
The solution of the above …rst-order condition is
In the second stage, player i's maximization problems are given by (4) and (5). The …rst-order conditions of these maximization problems are
In order that both constraints will be restrictive these …rst order conditions of the maximization problems in the second stage should be positive. Thus, both constraints are restrictive i¤
and the total e¤ort in the second stage is
The Proof of Proposition 6
If the budget constraint is partially restrictive only the second restriction in the maximization problem (3) is restrictive such that The …rst-order condition of this maximization problem is
Player i's maximization problem in the …rst stage is then
Therefore the …rst-order condition is
The solution of the …rst-order conditions (when v a = 1) from both stages (24) and (23) implies that the equilibrium e¤ort in the …rst stage x a is determined by the following equation 
The Proof of Proposition 7
If the budget constraint is partially restrictive only the …rst restriction in the maximization problem (6) is restrictive such that The …rst order of this maximization problem is 
The Proof of Theorem 1
If the budget constraint is restrictive all of the four restrictions in the maximization problems (13) and (14) are restrictive such that Thus, it can be veri…ed that the solution of the above …rst-order conditions (27) and (28) is x = e x = w 1 2 y = e y = w 2 2
The budget constraints are restrictive if the …rst-order conditions of the maximization problems in the second stage (9),(10), (11) and (12) In this case the total e¤ort in the …rst stage of the contest is
The total e¤ort in the second stage of the contest is T E 2 = e x a + e y d = e x b + e y c = w 1 + w 2 2
Therefore T E 1 = T E 2 Q:E:D:
